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The God Particle was Framed July 6, 2012

Posted by Alex Bove in Culture and Society, Religion, Skepticism and atheism.
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Last week, mostly in the comments section of my post on the difficulties of defining words clearly and universally, to everyone’s satisfaction, Wes and I discussed (among other topics) the importance of rhetorical framing. CERN’s recent announcement of the near-certain discovery of the Higgs-Boson (a.k.a. the “god particle”) has elicited surprising reactions from theists, and I think framing explains their response.

Some of you may have seen this Twitter feed making the rounds. When I first saw it, I was puzzled. How can theists claim that a discovery that demystifies a major, previously unanswered, question about the physical world is bad for atheism? I considered the possibility that the Twitter feed was a joke (and it may still be, though I think it’s serious), but then I came across other christian apologists making the same case. Many theists do, indeed, see this discovery as proof of their god’s existence. But why?

The answer, at least in part, is that apologists have reframed the term “god particle.” Fifty years ago, when physicist Peter Higgs hypothesized his eponymous boson, it was simply called the Higgs boson. The metaphor of a “god” particle comes from nobel laureate Leon Lederman’s 1993 book, The God Particle: If the Universe Is the Answer, What is the Question? In most press accounts, the phrase is bracketed by quotation marks, a rhetorical move meant either to indicate words/phrases that are being used in ways that might differ from their denotative meanings or to show potential biases of the word/phrase’s originator. When Rush Limbaugh called Sarah Fluke a “slut,” people reported that Rush had used that word to describe her, not that they were using it themselves.

By placing it in quotation marks, the mainstream media, then, frames “god particle” as a term that could at least be open to debate. I think they do this with varying degrees of success, and using the term at all gives it credibility that scientists wish it would not have. I think there’s plenty of blame to go around here. Scientists generally do a poor job of framing issues in the public discourse. Perhaps this is because they see language in general, and the language of the media especially, as needlessly slippery, and they do not want to engage in discussions involving terms/concepts that are not clearly, objectively provable. In a way, that’s what I’d expect of scientists: it’s what makes them good at science. However, it also reflects a type of black-and-white thinking that doesn’t always help factions make their rhetorical points.

But the media is also to blame for assuming its audience needs figurative language to understand complex ideas (though figurative language is certainly useful for this purpose, one must choose one’s metaphors carefully), for so readily and uncritically using normative (in this case theistic) figurative language, and for not doing the minimal amount of research needed to know that Leon Lederman himself thinks the term “god particle” is problematic. On this last point, I’m not sure it’s entirely fair to let Dr. Lederman off the hook. He has joked that his idea to call it the “goddamn” particle was shot down by editors, but he has also said that he used the term “god particle” because the Higgs boson was “so central to the state of physics today, so crucial to our final understanding of the structure of matter, yet so elusive.” It seems Dr. Lederman could think of no better way to communicate uncertainty than appeal to a deity, so he may have been foist by his own petard (along with the entire physics community, which is no stranger to using theistic metaphors to make its points).

Christian apologists, however, have used framing to remove the quotation marks completely. For them, “god particle” is not a metaphor but a descriptor. They refer to biblical passages like Colossians 1:15-18:

He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For by Him all things were created that are in heaven and that are on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers. All things were created through Him and for Him.

For apologists, then, the discovery of the Higgs boson particle is the discovery of the “invisible God.” This line of apologetics lauds scientific discoveries like the one at CERN as proof of the validity of the teleological argument. The problem, of course, is that they’re begging the question. The mere fact that we’re able to see a logical order to the material world does not prove that an unseen “logical” creator of that world exists. Whether or not that creator exists, our observations will be the same.

The thing about framing, though, is that it’s not always the same as misunderstanding–or, more insidiously, misusing–language. In the case of “god particle,” the problem is that the phrase’s two constituent words are abstract enough to allow myriad interpretations. The word “god” has almost a dozen definitions and “particle” has five. The definition of “particle” is particularly flexible, so it’s not altogether surprising that apologists would see “all things…that are on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers” as being made up of “one of the extremely small constituents of matter.” Somewhat ironically, the definition of “particle” with respect to English grammar is “a small word of functional or relational use.” In other words, a particle itself doesn’t belong to a clear category: it is not easily quantifiable. To the extent that it fits into a linguistic structure, its role in the logic of that structure is unknown/invisible, or at least not categorizable.

I’m not saying that I think apologists are right to see the discovery of the so-called “god particle” (see, was the “so-called” so hard to use?) as proof of a deity’s actual existence, of the universe’s “intelligent design,” etc. But I think that Leon Lederman’s choice of words was problematic, that the media’s dissemination of his phrase (utterly divorced from its original context, mind you–Lederman was worried his phrase might offend theists) was irresponsible, and the scientific community’s inability (or lack of desire) to frame the debate in a way most advantageous to its own case contributed to apologists’ declaration of victory.

Atheists (or materialists, secularists, etc.) see the world in a way that we believe is fundamentally right, but we don’t have the power of cultural normativity–and its concomitant ease of rhetorical framing–on our side. As a result, we must be especially vehement in pointing out the ways in which dominant groups use framing to buttress their hegemony. We must understand, however, that framing is a technique we also use. Demystifying framing is necessary in order to understand how it functions, but demystification alone does not necessarily change the rules of the rhetorical game.

 

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Burden of proof and the null hypothesis July 17, 2009

Posted by shaunphilly in religion, atheism, polyamory, culture.
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Randal Rauser

Randal Rauser

Today I ran into the following article on cristianpost.com, written by Randal Rauser.  Here are a few excerpts:

One of my skeptical readers, EnoNomi, takes issue with my claim that atheists and agnostics shoulder an evidential burden to defend their belief just as much as the theist does. This is what EnoNomi writes:

“It’s not up to the Atheist or the Agnostic to prove anything because you can’t prove a negative. I can no more prove that your god doesn’t exist than you can prove Odin or Zeus doesn’t exist.”

This is an important comment because it reflects a commonly held, but also incorrect view.

Interesting.  It looks like, at this point, Randal is quite aware of the concept of burden of proof.  It looks like he will address this issue, and if he does it may be something I’ve not heard before.  I eagerly keep reading.

Rauser then discusses that there are different kinds of proof.  Logical and mathematical proof being the highest, and other kinds of proof being lesser, but still valid. While I may think that in situations like court proceedings, the word ‘proof’ may not be the best, I’ll accept the general premise that in other areas besides logic and mathematics, lesser degrees of certainty exist necessarily.

So now to God. What kind of standard of evidence is the atheist required to provide in order to justify disbelief in God? Logical certainty? Beyond a reasonable doubt? A preponderance of the evidence? Who decides?

It seems to me that there is no clear answer here. Rather, it seems most likely that the more evidence the atheist can provide, the stronger the justification for his/her belief.

This, I believe, is where the discussion goes all wrong.  This is where I saw that Rauser didn’t really understand the most important aspect of the burden of proof.  Atheists don’t have to disprove god, and he knows this as he quoted above.  This article of his is an attempt to address this issue, but so far he has not done so.

What he has done, so far, is state that atheists can provide evidence, and the strength of that evidence will either lend support for their belief or not.  But that is precisely the problem.  The atheist does not have to provide any evidence at all.  The atheist is not the one with any burden of proof.  The reason is simple: The null hypothesis.

The null hypothesis, in this context, is to assume that something does not exist until there is sufficient evidence to accept that it does.  That is the position that the word ‘atheist’ describes; a rejection of the claims about existing gods due to lack of evidence (or the lack of belief in any gods).  It is not the position or belief that a god does not exist.  This is the fundamental misunderstanding of Rauser and many other theists (and some atheists who call themselves agnostics) who try and analyze this issue; a misunderstanding of the atheist position.  Sure, some atheists will say that they believe that god does not exist, but this is saying something more than atheism per se.

Rauser confirms this misunderstanding of atheism/agnosticism in the parenthetical sentence that follows my last quotation of him;

(Conversely, the more doubt the agnostic — or weak atheist as some of my interlocutors prefer to say — can cast, the stronger the justification for his/her withholding of belief.)

Agnosticism is not withholding belief. One either believes or one does not.  If one is considering the question or withholding judgment, this is technically a position of being without belief.  Agnosticism is simply admitting one does not know with certainty.  Name me anyone that this does not apply to and I’ll show you a liar; everyone is, therefore, agnostic.  The question is what one believes.

This is a distinction I wish more people would be aware of.  And Rauser seems to be somewhat aware of the issues.  He addresses the question of certainty about other gods besides his own:

So back to EnoNomi’s claim. Can I prove that Odin or Zeus do not exist? It all depends. I cannot provide a logical proof. But could I provide a lesser proof? Beyond a reasonable doubt? Or a preponderance of the evidence? I suspect I could. Certainly EnoNomi cannot simply declare by fiat that I cannot.

She may, but I don’t know.  I think that it’s possible to do what Rauser claims; to prove to a great degree of certainty that gods such as Zeus do not exist.  But what about his god? Well, let’s see what he says:

And this is what many atheists in fact attempt when it comes to the Judeo-Christian God: they seek to provide a lesser proof to support the conclusion that God does not exist. For instance, Vic Stenger attempts this in his book God: The Failed Hypothesis where he argues that current science warrants the conclusion that God does not exist. I may disagree, but Stenger is right that belief in God is up for critical review.

Atheist Austin Dacey has referred to this lesser proof approach as the “look and see” method. Essentially we engage in an a posteriori (or empircal) enquiry, looking to see whether the universe evinces signs of God’s presence. If it does not then we can reasonably infer that God is absent or, to put it another way, that God does not exist.

But one can go further: it is also possible to develop a logical disproof for the existence of God. The way one would do so is by showing that there is a logical contradiction between certain attributes God possesses (e.g. a conflict between omnipotence and omnibenevolence) or between God’s attributes and certain indisputable characteristics of the world (e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence and the existence of evil).

This is certainly a fair summary of some of the positions and points that atheists often make.  I commend Rauser for being aware of them and treating them fairly, as many apologists are not and do not.  I find it honestly refreshing to see analysis by a Christian theist that is aware of what atheists actually say.  So, when he states the following, I at least am not too frustrated…just a little frustrated.

As a committed Christian theist, I do not believe that the atheist has provided any of these proofs, though I do agree that there are certain lines of evidence which prima facie count against the existence of God as defined by the Christian theist.

Again, here is the problem.  Proof that any god does not exist is strictly epistemologically impossible.  He did gloss over the logical contradiction approach to attempting this “(e.g. a conflict between omnipotence and omnibenevolence),” and he is right to point out that the definition of god is slippery.

There is a remaining grumble that one hears: as soon as a purported disproof for God’s existence is provided, the definition of God is changed. Thus, theism is a target forever moving. For the moment I’ll concede that this is occurring (that is, that the concept of God has evolved because of the proffering of disproofs for earlier concepts).

Yes, indeed.  The definition of god changes every time we improve our understanding of the universe (I’ve written about this recently) and thus make another attribute of some god absurd.  Because of this process, the definition of god retreats once again to something more mysterious, ephemeral, and nonsensical.

But Rauser is not finished with the slippery god yet:

But even if true, is that a ground for complaint? From the atheist’s perspective it would just mean that he or she is guaranteed a job, forever knocking down new concepts of God like a centuries’ old game of metaphysical Wac-a-mole.

Yes.  And what you seem to be missing is that you are continuing the game of re-defining god every time we show more and more about why our lack of belief in your (or others’) god is justified.  That is, our skepticism, our lack of belief due to lack of sufficient reason to believe, is warranted.

Atheists like myself will continue to write and argue because you keep changing the rules.  We are reactionary, admittedly.  We see what you propose as a being that exists and that you call ‘god’ and we will continue to say “I don’t believe you” to which you will continue to insist that we can’t disprove god and we’ll continue to reply that this is not the point; we simply have no good reason to think your claim is correct.

It is your job to provide good reason to accept the claim, not ours to disprove it.  You say God exists, I say I don’t believe you.  I don’t believe you because it’s silly to accept such spurious claims with no good rational support.  You reject all the other gods, such as Zeus, Rama, or even Allah and I just reject yours for similar reasons.

But the main point here is that the atheist can in principle provide a weak or strong proof for God’s non-existence. And thus the atheist cannot protest that such a thing cannot be expected of him or her because it is impossible.

What is impossible? It’s impossible to present a weak or strong argument (not proof) for god’s non-existence? That can be done, but again that’s not the point.  I would like to see an alternate phrasing of this last quoted section, because I’m not quite sure what he is saying.

It’s a problem I have with many theists; I don’t know what they are saying, and so I leave thinking they are saying nonsense most of the time.  Tell me what you believe and why.  If I don’t understand what you mean then I can’t believe it, can I? And if I can understand it I can surely not believe it if I don’t see good reason to accept it, right?  That’s what I mean when I say I’m an atheist.